U.S. forces are leaving their final bases in Iraq more than 23 years after the 2003 invasion, closing one military chapter while opening a consequential test of whether Baghdad can contain armed factions, prevent an Islamic State resurgence and preserve relations with both Washington and Tehran.
The withdrawal is scheduled to be completed by Wednesday, September 30. It follows a timetable negotiated by the United States and Iraq in 2024 and implemented by the Trump administration. For many Iraqis, the departure is a long-awaited assertion of sovereignty. For Iran and allied armed groups, it is being celebrated as a strategic victory. For Iraqi officials responsible for security, it removes intelligence, logistical and surveillance support at a moment of intense regional conflict.
This is not simply the end of another overseas deployment. Iraq has spent years trying to occupy a rare position between two adversaries: it maintains important political, economic and security relationships with both the United States and Iran. Removing the American military presence changes that balance and could affect counterterrorism, energy security and the wider struggle for influence across the Middle East.
A withdrawal agreed under Biden and completed under Trump
The departure was not ordered in response to a single recent attack. It is the final stage of a transition announced by Washington and Baghdad in September 2024. The two governments agreed that the U.S.-led coalition’s military mission in Iraq would end and be replaced by bilateral security relationships.
The original joint statement published by the U.S. State Department described a phased transition intended to account for the Islamic State threat, operational conditions and the capabilities of Iraqi forces. A Pentagon explanation at the time said the coalition mission would evolve into an enduring bilateral partnership rather than simply ending all security cooperation.
Iraq has since said its forces are capable of protecting the country and that future U.S. ties should increasingly centre on economic, investment and development cooperation. In July, the Iraqi government formed a technical committee to redesign the security relationship after the withdrawal.
The practical details of that next relationship will matter. Training, arms sales, intelligence sharing and diplomatic coordination can continue without permanent American bases. But those arrangements are more limited than having U.S. personnel, aircraft and surveillance systems operating inside the country.
Two decades defined by invasion, withdrawal and return
The United States invaded Iraq in March 2003 and overthrew Saddam Hussein’s government. The invasion and occupation dismantled the old state order, triggered a violent insurgency and helped deepen sectarian divisions. Washington withdrew its remaining troops at the end of 2011.
American forces returned less than three years later after Islamic State swept across large areas of Iraq and Syria, seized Mosul and declared a self-styled caliphate. Iraqi troops, Kurdish forces, local militias and the U.S.-led coalition eventually destroyed the group’s territorial rule in Iraq by 2017.
About 4,500 U.S. service members died in the Iraq war and subsequent operations, according to Reuters’ September 29 report. The human cost to Iraqis was far greater, encompassing civilians, members of the security forces and fighters across successive phases of conflict. The war also displaced millions and left political and institutional consequences that continue today.
The history explains why the withdrawal carries contradictory meanings. It can be seen as the restoration of national control after a deeply controversial foreign intervention. It can also be understood as the removal of a security partner that helped stop Islamic State from controlling major Iraqi cities.
Iran gains room—but influence is not the same as control
Iran has spent years building political, economic and security influence in Iraq. Several powerful Iraqi armed factions maintain close ties to Tehran, and some operate within or alongside the state-funded Popular Mobilization Forces. These groups have repeatedly demanded a full U.S. withdrawal and have at times attacked American positions.
Iranian officials and allied groups describe the departure as a defeat for the United States. Their political leverage may grow once the principal foreign military counterweight to Tehran is gone.
But it would be misleading to describe Iraq as simply falling under Iranian control. Iraq has its own national interests, competing parties, religious authorities, Kurdish institutions, Arab relationships and a public that has repeatedly protested against both domestic corruption and foreign interference. Iran-linked groups are influential, but they do not act as a single unified bloc and face resistance from Iraqis who want the state—not militias or outside powers—to control weapons and national policy.
The government’s central test is therefore not whether it chooses Washington or Tehran. It is whether it can prevent either relationship from overriding Iraqi institutions.
The unresolved Islamic State threat
Islamic State no longer governs cities or large territories in Iraq, but the organization has not disappeared. Sleeper cells remain active in rural and disputed areas, using assassinations, roadside bombs and small attacks to sustain fear and exploit gaps between security forces.
Some Iraqi and Kurdish officials told Reuters that they fear losing U.S. intelligence, drone and logistical support could give those cells more space. A Kurdish commander said movement by suspected sleeper cells had increased as the withdrawal approached. Iraqi officials also said they disrupted a suspected cell allegedly preparing suicide attacks timed to the pullout. Those claims underline the concern but do not establish that a broad resurgence has begun.
The United Nations’ latest Security Council briefing, held in August, described Islamic State and its affiliates as a persistent international threat that continues to adapt under counterterrorism pressure.
Iraq’s security forces have become significantly more capable since the collapse of units in Mosul in 2014. In 2025, the U.S.-led task force validated their ability to manage an independent strike process, describing it as a milestone in the transition. The difficult question is whether those capabilities can be sustained nationwide without the coalition’s embedded support.
Why the withdrawal matters beyond Iraq
Iraq borders Iran, Syria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Kuwait. Its territory connects the Gulf, the Levant and major energy routes. Instability inside Iraq rarely stays inside Iraq.
A stronger position for Iran-aligned factions could affect neighbouring states and sharpen tensions with Gulf governments. A renewed Islamic State campaign could threaten Syria and complicate the management of detainees and displaced families linked to the group. Any confrontation between armed factions and the Iraqi state could disrupt oil production from one of the world’s largest exporters.
The departure also changes American regional strategy. Washington will have fewer forces positioned inside Iraq for intelligence collection, deterrence and rapid operations. It may rely more heavily on other regional bases, remote surveillance and cooperation with Iraqi institutions.
That reduced footprint could lower the number of attacks directed at U.S. bases and remove a recurring source of confrontation. It could also make Washington slower to detect or respond to emerging threats. Both outcomes are possible, which is why the withdrawal cannot responsibly be described as either a clear triumph or an inevitable disaster.
Sovereignty will be measured by what follows
The most important question is not whether foreign troops leave on schedule. It is what authority fills the space they leave behind.
If Iraq’s elected government controls security decisions, keeps armed groups subordinate to the state and maintains professional counterterrorism forces, the withdrawal could mark a genuine normalization after decades of war. If militia influence expands, intelligence gaps widen or political disputes paralyse national forces, the same moment could expose new vulnerabilities.
Iraq’s leaders also face a broader public expectation: that sovereignty should produce better governance, not merely the absence of foreign soldiers. Citizens will judge the transition by security, electricity, jobs, public services and whether the law applies to powerful armed groups as well as ordinary people.
The American military chapter in Iraq is ending again. This time, there is no declared caliphate controlling major cities and no formal plan for U.S. combat forces to return. But the forces that shaped the last two decades—regional rivalry, armed factions, institutional weakness and extremist networks—have not vanished.
The success of the withdrawal will therefore be determined less by the final convoy leaving a base than by whether Iraq can turn the symbolism of independence into durable state authority.
Sources: Reuters; U.S.–Iraq joint statement; U.S. Department of Defense; Iraqi News Agency; United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee.
